Identification of the viewership and revenue coefficients relies upon the assumption that the timing of ownership changes was prompted by an exogenously timed deregulation. If some ownership changes were instead driven by expected changes in stations' outcome variables, this reverse causality could bias the coefficients of interest. To address this concern, I conduct a robustness check in which the revenue and viewership coefficients are estimated off of only those station purchases that would have been explicitly disallowed before 1996. The revenue and viewership results, shown in Table 1 and Table 3 , are not much changed. Cost coefficients are re-estimated using the new revenue and viewership coefficients. The estimator then includes hypothetical purchases for only the stations that were involved in previously-disallowed purchases from 1996 to 2007, because these are the stations for which I have estimated viewership and revenue fixed effects. Therefore I have fewer hypothetical sales (35,710 instead of 112,062) . Results, shown in Table 2 , are very little changed.
Another concern is that I could be missing important effects of consolidation by not including arrangements in which one group agrees to operate a station owned by another group (variously called local/joint/shared marketing/sales/service/management agreements). As a robustness check, I use manually collected data on these agreements and run the viewership and revenue regressions with these data included.
1 If group A has an agreement to operate a station owned by group B, I treat the station as being owned by group A. The revenue and viewership results, shown in Table 4 and Table 5 , are so little changed that I do not re-estimate the second-stage cost coefficients.
An identification concern, specifically with respect to the revenue coefficients, is that unobserved demand shocks could simultaneously raise advertising prices and viewership. If I constrain revenue per viewer to be constant, then the price shock is forced into the error term, leading to omitted variable bias. One way to address this concern is to allow for a flexible relationship between viewership and revenue, which allows for the possibility that advertising prices rise when viewership rises. As a robustness check, I run the revenue regression with a piecewise linear specification for the viewership regressor. The results are shown in Table 6 ; competition variable coefficients are omitted for sake of brevity. The revenue coefficient on viewership does vary with viewership, but as shown in Table 7 , the differences are generally not statistically significant. There is some evidence that, for observations with extreme values for viewership, revenue per viewer is indeed higher. However, the coefficients on the ownership variables in the piecewise linear specification are virtually identical to those in the baseline specification. Because the viewership and revenue results are essentially unchanged, I do not re-estimate the second-stage cost coefficients.
In another robustness check, I specify the viewership, revenue and cost equations as log-linear rather than linear. Viewership and revenue are highly skewed, as can be seen in the table of summary statistics; presumably cost is as well. The concern is that, by specifying linear relationships, I may be biasing coefficients or simply not capturing the correct relationships between variables. This is especially worrisome in a setting in which I am constructing out-of-sample predictions. Viewership and revenue results are indeed a bit changed in the log-linear specifications, as shown in Table 8 and Table 10 , but are not very different. The final column in each of the log-linear tables provides for easy comparison with the baseline results. In the revenue results, one notable difference is the coefficient on network domination; this variable has a bigger revenue impact according to the logged results. In the viewership results, the logged specification suggests that competitors' national size and network ownership are less important than in the baseline specification. Overall, though, results are very similar. In the final step in this robustness check, I use these log-linear viewership and revenue results as inputs to estimate a log-linear cost equation. Log-linear cost results are shown in Table 9 . I cannot estimate standard errors for the cost coefficients for computational reasons, 2 so I can look only at coefficient signs and magnitudes, not statistical significance. Results are quite similar to the baseline specification; again, it is easiest to compare the last column.
The remaining robustness checks are specifically for the cost coefficients, taking the viewership and revenue coefficients as given. A series of four robustness checks address concerns about weighting in the cost estimator. The estimator weights large violations of the inequalities more heavily than small violations. One consequence is that large (highrevenue) stations and large markets are given more weight than are small stations and small markets. I run a series of robustness checks to ensure that this weighting is not having an undue effect on my results. In Table 11 , only hypothetical sales involves stations in small markets (those that are not ranked in the top 50 in terms of number of viewing households) are included in estimation. In Table 12 , only hypothetical sales involving stations in large markets (those ranked in the top 50 in terms of number of viewing households)are included in estimation. In Table 13 , only hypothetical sales involving small stations (those below the 50th percentile in terms of 2007 revenue) are included in estimation. Lastly, in Table 14 , only hypothetical sales involving large stations (those below the 50th percentile in terms of 2007 revenue) are included in estimation. In each case, results are very little changed from the baseline results.
The final set of robustness checks are meant to address concerns about whether estimates of the cost coefficients are sensitive to the choice of 2007 as the year in which to explain the industry structure. In the baseline specification, I find the cost coefficients that explain the 2007 industry structure; this is under the assumption that in 2007 the industry is in equilibrium, or at the very least not in a period of dramatic adjustment. I do not want to find the cost coefficients that explain the industry structure in, say, 1999, when the industry was undergoing rapid consolidation following the 1996 deregulation. However, it should be the case that the industry was in a relatively Similarly, I find the cost coefficients that explain the 1995 (pre-deregulation) industry structure rather than the 2007 (post-deregulation) industry structure. The assumption is that the industry was in a sort of stable state in 1995, before the deregulation took effect. I must construct the inequalities from hypothetical sales that would have been allowed in 1995, under pre-deregulation ownership rules. There are 74,540 such sales (versus 112,062 that would have been allowed in 2007, under post-deregulation ownership rules). Also, the ownership variables in the cost equation must be modified a bit. I cannot estimate a cost coefficient on Duopoly, because "duopolies" were not allowed in 1995 (with very few exceptions). Similarly, I cannot identify the cost coefficient on Num in State, because there are few instances of within-state clusters of stations in 1995 (either in reality, or that would have been allowed hypothetically). As a substitute, I estimate a cost coefficient on Num in Region, which is the number of jointly owned stations in the same region of the country.
Results from this robustness check are shown in Table 17 . As noted, there is no coefficient estimated for Duopoly. The coefficient on Num in Region here is similar to the coefficient on Num in State in the baseline specification. The coefficients on Demog Variety, Network Owned and Num in Net are similar to the baseline specification. Coefficients on Num in Country and Num New Cables are the wrong signs, but this is not too disturbing given that, in the baseline specification, coefficients on these variables were not statistically significant and therefore were not important parts of the story. Lastly, I no longer estimate a statistically significant effect from Avg Dist. Table 1 for variable definitions. ***, **, * Significant at, or below, 1, 5, 10 percent, respectively. † In this column, the *, * and *** refer, where applicable, to the joint sta s cal significance of the two coefficients (that is, the coefficient for the variable and the coefficient for the variable interacted with the time trend). Table 1 for variable definitions. ***, **, * Significant at, or below, 1, 5, 10 percent, respectively. † In this column, the *, * and *** refer, where applicable, to the joint sta s cal significance of the two coefficients (that is, the coefficient for the variable and the coefficient for the variable interacted with the time trend). ‡ Evaluated at average revenue. Dependent variable is logged station viewership, in thousands of households. Station, firm, year and network fixed effects are included.
Refer to Table 1 for variable definitions. ***, **, * Significant at, or below, 1, 5, 10 percent, respectively. † In this column, the *, * and *** refer, where applicable, to the joint sta s cal significance of the two coefficients (that is, the coefficient for the variable and the coefficient for the variable interacted with the time trend). ‡ Evaluated at average viewership. 
